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 I Introduction 
       The consumer lending “revolution”1 –with its promise of the democratisation of credit—has  
been followed by the credit crunch.   The credit crunch  has stimulated  both immediate regulatory 
initiatives and more fundamental reflection on consumer credit regulation. 2  As the Turner review in 
the UK notes, conventional regulatory assumptions—that reputable firms do not place risky products 
on the market, that innovation is stifled by regulation and that regulators are not as well placed as the 
market to judge the value of products—have been challenged by the credit crunch.3   
      Regulation of consumer credit markets has been on the policy agenda in many countries during 
the past decade. Objectives have included “modernization” 4,  regulation of unfair practices and 
addressing the problems of  overindebtedness and financial exclusion. The credit crunch may increase 
both these latter phenomena.5  In the UK  the first years of the 21st century were characterized by a  
flurry of inquiries6, reports7,  task forces8 , legislation9,  regulation10 and “soft law”11 on consumer 
                                                     
1 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation “Evaluating the Consumer Lending Revolution” (2003) 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/091703fyi.html (accessed 29.7.2008) and R. Brown and S. 
Burhouse (2005) “Implications of the Supply-Side Revolution in Consumer Lending” 24 St. Louis University 
Public Law Review pp.363 et seq. This revolution included: financial liberalisation, deregulation of interest 
rates, securitisation, the application of sophisticated computer technology to develop predictive credit scores and 
risk-based pricing, and the increasing spread of all-purpose credit cards. 
2  UK government promises a White Paper  which  will “ initiate a debate on the long term vision for consumer 
credit in the UK” See DBERR  and “Building Britain’s Future” (Treasury, Budget 2009). In US President 
Obama proposes a Consumer  Financial Protection Agency “dedicated to consumer protection in credit, savings 
and payments markets”  See Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation  (June 2009). See also the Credit CARD Act 2009 HR 627. 
Peter Gowan suggests the possibility of returning to a public utility model of financial services. See  P. Gowan, 
“Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System” (2009) 55  New Left Review 5. See  
also  R Wade “Financial Regime Change?” (2008) New Left Review 5.  See also. studies by Joint Centre for 
Housing Studies Harvard University at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/ : Bar-Gill and Warren 
argue for a Consumer Credit Safety Commission which would screen credit products for safety. See  O Bar-Gill 
and E Warren, Making Credit Safer http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137981 (accessed 05.08.08): R Shiller The Sub-
Prime Solution Princeton: Princeton UP 2008; . M Barr, S Mullainathan and E Shafir, Behaviourally Informed 
Financial Services Regulation (New America Foundation, 2008). 
3  Turner Review 2009. 
4  See e.g. South Africa (2005), EU (2008), UK (2006),  Japan, 2006, discussed in  S Kozuka and L Nottage, 
“The Myth of the Cautious Consumer: Law, Culture, Economics and Politics in the Rise and Partial Fall of 
Unsecured Lending in Japan” in J Niemi, I Ramsay and W Whit ford, Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy: 
Comparative and International Perspectives (in press Oxford, Hart, 2009).  
5 Financial exclusion has been defined as “ a process whereby people encounter difficulties accessing and /or 
using financial services and products in the mainstream market that are appropriate to their needs and enable 
them to lead a normal life in the society to which they belong... ”    See European Commission Financial 
Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities Executive Summary at  3.  There is no universally accepted definition of over-
indebtedness.   In the  EU see Towards a Common Operational European Definition of Over-Indebtedness DG 
Employment Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008) (concluding that it is caused by combination of risk 
factors (for example  low income, age) combined with change of circumstances compounded in some cases by 
poor money management and over-commitment). The minutes of the Financial Inclusion Task Force in 
September 2008 note that “progress on bank engagement and affordable credit has yielded less positive results 
than had been anticipated due to the changing economic environment”.  Leyshon and Thrift, discussing the 
recession of the late 80s and early 90s argue that “financial crises...tend to induce a ‘flight to quality’...a search 
for ‘safer’ markets...which tends to discriminate in favour of more affluent and powerful social groups and 
against poor and disadvantaged groups.” A Leyson & N Thrift, “Geographies of financial exclusion: financial 
abandonment in Britain and the United States” (1995)  Transactions of the Royal Institute of Geographers 312. 
6  See Competition Commission inquiries into home credit, store credit cards, and payment protection insurance. 
Available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/  . 
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credit, over-indebtedness and financial inclusion.  There has  also been an   increasing 
“internationalisation” of    regulatory models: this diffusion occurs through regional initiatives,12  the 
influence of international  institutions, legal transplants,  and the practices of international  financial 
institutions.13  The World Bank has  outlined a model of consumer protection in financial services. 14  
              Assumptions about the function of consumer credit in contemporary economies will affect 
the form of regulation.   Consumer credit  performs several functions. It facilitates consumerism, 
compensates for stagnant growth in wages, and may smooth fluctuations in income and substitute for 
social spending in economies with limited social provision15.  Credit may  purchase therefore  not 
only “private” consumer goods and services but also public goods such as  education . Mortgage 
credit is a key to home ownership ---in turn a key to other services such as education—and  of great 
social importance in many countries16.  Consumer credit  may contribute to an individual’s capability 
in society.17 Consumer credit is  therefore  a central aspect of  contemporary economies,   part of the 
financialisation18 of modern life.   The consequences of a credit crunch are significant for many 
groups—both middle and lower income consumers.   
             A society organised around a high level of consumerism and limited public provision will 
inevitably result in  high levels of consumer credit. The US  provides the historical experiment of a  
“consumers’ republic”  where high levels of consumption facilitated by low cost mortgages and tax-
subsidised consumer credit were intended to  ensure high employment and productivity and provide 
equality through   consumption without the necessity for a substantial welfare state.19  Lizabeth Cohen 
describes  the “explosion” of credit  in the US between 1945-60 when credit became “an admission 
                                                                                                                                                                     
7  See e.g. Griffiths Commission, What Price Credit? (London, Centre for Social Justice 2005) and the reports of 
the Treasury Select Committee on Credit Cards  
8  See the various reports of  the Task Forces on Over-Indebtedness  and Fuel Poverty (available at the DBERR 
website http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/consumers/consumer-finance/over-indebtedness/index.html .  
9  The Consumer Credit Act 2006 
10  See the 2004 regulations on precontractual information and advertising in consumer credit and the Orders 
made by the Competition Commission in relation to store cards and home credit.  
11 One could include here changes to the Banking Code of Practice, the issuance of guidance by the Office of 
Fair Trading on debt-collection practices and  “irresponsible lending”. 
12  See e.g. recent EU Consumer Credit Directive and project on over-indebtedness and financial exclusion. 
13 See J Braithwaite (2008) Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar) for a discussion of the 
“diffusion” of  international norms. 
14  See below 2.1. 
15 Credit cards may provide a substitute for  income assistance and public welfare in countries such as the US 
and UK. See Ramsay, 2003. 
16  See M Stephens, “Mortgage Market Deregulation and its Consequences” (2007) Housing Studies 201-220. 
17 See Sen Development as Freedom (Oxford:OUP, 1999)  at 39who views microfinance as increasing the 
capacities of the poor. Discussions often do not distinguish between credit for production and consumption. See 
M. Hudon, “Should Access to Credit be a Right?” (2009)   84 Journal of Business Ethics 17.  
18  On financialisation see e.g. R Martin The Financialisation of Daily Life Philadelphia: Temple 2002. On the 
relationship of financialization to consumer debt see J Montgomerie Financialization and Consumption; an 
alternative account of rising consumer debt levels in Anglo-America (CRESC Working Paper No 43) 
(December 2007). See also, P Gowan, “Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System” 
(2009) 55 New Left Review 5; C Lapsavitsas, “Financialised Capitalism” 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/events/event43769  ; T. Palley, “Financialization: What it is and why it matters 
(University of Amherst, Mass. Working Paper, November 2007. 
 
19 See L. Cohen (2003), A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass-Consumption in Postwar America (New 
York: Knopf). 
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ticket” to consumer citizenship and  prosperity. This model was  adopted about a generation later in 
the UK during the 1970s and 1980s along with  a transition from producerism to consumerism in 
politics and cutbacks in the welfare state. In contrast,  several continental European countries  
continue  to have lower levels of consumer credit  than the UK and higher levels of social security. 
                   There remain significant differences in levels of consumer credit and  approaches to   
regulation of consumer credit in the EU  with contrasts drawn between “Anglo Saxon” approaches to 
regulation which emphasise freedom to obtain credit and countries such as France and Germany 
which are more likely to protect an individual from the credit market . The institutional framework  of 
credit markets and  regulation also differ within Europe concerning issues such as  the role of credit 
bureaux, the use of interest rate ceilings, credit card practices and regulation, the availability of home 
mortgage loans and the size of the non-profit financial  sector. These differences, which may reflect   
legal origins20, political economy , 21 or  distinct approaches to consumerism22,  challenge the 
ambition to create an integrated EU credit market which achieves both a competitive market  and  the  
social goals of financial inclusion and affordable access to credit.  The relative balance between these 
goals and the role of regulation in the European market is not merely a technical problem.  There is 
also political competition in  the internationalisation of national models of regulation. Until recently 
the UK compared its model of credit regulation favourably with other countries, claiming for example 
that restrictive German consumer credit legislation had contributed to the sluggish growth of the 
German  economy.23 While this may seem now like hubris, it highlights the need for  careful 
comparative study to understand the assumptions, norms and effects of distinct regulatory regimes. 
                                                     
20  See e.g.  R La Porta et al “Law and Finance” 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155: La Porta et al 
“The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins” (November 2007).. See the review and critique of this 
approach in  C. Milhaupt and K Pistor Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems 
and Economic Development around the World  (Chicago: University of Chicago) (2008). 
21 Reflecting the influence of different political groups or ideologies. See e.g. D Harvey A Brief History of Neo-
Liberalism  (2005) at 61-62. 
22 See J. Whitman, ‘Consumerism versus Producerism: An Essay in Comparative Law’ (2007) Yale Law Journal 
pp. 340 et seq. at 382 
23  This is the tenor of research carried out for the DTI [now DBIS]  Policis The Economic and Social Risks of 
Credit Market Regulation 
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TABLE 1 Outstanding Levels of Consumer Credit Selected European Countries October 2008 [€bn] 
 
 
 
Source: Deutche Bundesbank Statistics and Bank of England Monetary and Financial Statistics cited 
in DBERR  Impact Assessment of the Consumer Credit Directive (2008) 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Consumer Credit per Capita 2004  
 
UK 
 
4200 
FRANCE 2200 
GERMANY 2700 
CZECH 200 
FINLAND 1300 
Source European Credit Research Institute 
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TABLE 3  UK Net Unsecured Lending Flows (£bn) 2004-
2008
 
Source Bank of England Lending Trends (2009) 
            There are  two basic conceptualisations of credit regulation in contemporary policy literature. 
The first is to treat it as a  “private” commodity. Even within this conceptualisation there may be 
substantial scope for regulation based on market failures(information, externalities)  on the supply and 
demand side.    Warren and Bar Gill argue that credit products like toasters  should meet minimum 
safety requirements and their safety should be regulated through similar techniques (information, 
warnings, standards, recalls, bans) to those adopted for other consumer products.    A second approach 
is to view credit  services as a service of general interest—as a necessary part of life—and subject to 
public service obligations. In developed countries financial exclusion – where individuals do not have 
access to the financial system or have restricted access to only high cost credit – may lead to social 
exclusion and undermine tax and welfare redistributions.  Access to affordable credit may not be a 
human right but ideas associated with services of general interest such as equality of access, non-
discriminatory treatment and  corporate social responsibility to clients   might be argued as affecting 
regulation of credit markets and underpin a conception of responsible lending.24Gowan sets forth 
three reasons for treating financial services as a public utility: they are vital public services and 
inherently unstable; policy questions concerning the channelling of credit to industrial or consumer 
use raise issues of great economic and social significance; and financial services should be subject to 
democratic control.25   
                                                     
 24 See Commission of the EU Green Paper on services of general economic interest COM (2003) 270. 
The EU classifies services of  general interest as services of an economic nature” which are “subject to public 
service obligations”. The EU does not currently classify financial services as a service of general interest. 
 
25 Gowan op cit. 
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           Alternative classifications of consumer credit affect our understanding of the credit contract 
and the role of lenders and borrowers.  If credit is a service of general interest then “responsible 
lending”—an influential concept in many reform initiatives26---  could include not only an obligation 
on financial service providers   to be  prudent lenders  but also to  reach out to groups which are 
underserved.   Three methods  to achieve this objective appear in existing literature.27  First there is  
the promotion of  non-profit institutions such as credit unions (savings banks in Germany, France and  
Spain).  A second approach is to encourage mainstream banks to ensure access to excluded groups. 
This may be achieved through embedding public obligations as a ground rule of the banking system.  
Third, the state might provide a dedicated fund as in the  UK where small loans may be made 
available through state agencies such as the social fund. The UK has rejected imposing obligations on 
mainstream financial institutions and has promoted the “third sector” of credit unions and community 
initiatives28.                    
           We do not explore  these  issues at length  in this paper but we believe that public obligations 
should be embedded in the  mainstream financial system using the  model (if not the actual practice) 
of the US Community Reinvestment Act.  George Gloukoviezoff has recently argued  for a general 
“solidary objective” to be written into the objectives of the financial system29 . This would be a true 
“Third Way” between dominant forms of regulation (financial literacy, better disclosures, and credit 
data sharing) and state redistribution.  Georges  Gloukoviezoff argues that solidary outcome 
objectives would be required for the banking system but banks would not be required to meet these 
objectives. However, if they failed to do so they would have to make a financial contribution to those 
who had  met the objectives. This would  make it less efficient to practice financial exclusion and 
would promote a more cooperative capitalism. The   recent  EU report on Financial Exclusion 
proposes a similar plan that there should be a compensatory financing mechanism for those banks 
which provide universal services so that they are not disadvantaged competitively30. We think  that 
this model should be considered seriously in the UK where  UK Financial Investments Limited has 
already imposed an obligation to lend on financial institutions in which it has a financial stake31. 
                              In this  paper we take the fundamental issues in credit to be those of availability 
and safety and  examine an influential international model of consumer credit regulation, identified by 
the World Bank, which we  characterise as a neo-liberal approach to regulation.  However even within 
this model public regulation of consumer credit markets is accepted as necessary to achieve public 
confidence and achieve fairness. The recent US  proposal to create a Consumer Financial Protection 
                                                     
26 Responsible lending was highlighted in the initial draft of the recent EU consumer credit directive. This draft  
included a suitability of credit requirement along with an obligation on creditors to check credit databases and 
reflected  the Belgian approach to credit regulation. This provision was ultimately watered down to an 
obligation to explain and advise on  credit options so that a consumer is in a position to make an informed 
decision,  and to check credit  databases where appropriate. See arts 5, and 8. Recital 26 of the Directive states 
that  governments should promote responsible lending practices throughout the lending transaction 
“Irresponsible lending” is  a factor to take into account in determining whether to grant or revoke a credit 
licence in the UK  The National Credit Act of South Africa 2005 prohibits “reckless lending” (see ss 78-81) 
27  See discussion in EC Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Financial 
Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion (2008). 
28 The third sector of credit unions etc remains very small in England  compared with other countries. 
29  See G Gloukoviezoff   De l’exclusion à l’inclusion bancaire des particuliers en France : entre nécessité 
sociale et contrainte de rentabilité (PhD Thesis, Lyon, 2008). 
30 See EC Financial Services Provision and Prevention of Financial Exclusion op cit 
31  Placing and Open Offer Agreement between the RBS groupPLC, UBS Ltd, Merrill Lynch International and 
the Commissioners of HM Treasury 13 October, 2008. 
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Agency is intriguing since a    form of this regulation already exists in the UK  in the overlapping 
jurisdiction of the UK Office of Fair Trading and Financial Services Authority over credit markets  
and we examine the recent regulation of sub-prime lending and payment protection insurance by the 
FSA. We conclude that this may provide a promising model for future credit regulation, but will not 
solve the problem of achieving affordable access to credit.          
            A final  preliminary point  concerns the variety of explanations for the contemporary  global 
financial crisis. 32  One strand of explanation  links the credit crunch to consumer profligacy—the idea 
that there has been a “credit binge” during the past decade in countries such as the UK and the US in 
the service of rampant consumerism.  Avner Offer develops  a more elegant explanation, arguing that 
consumer overspending represents a pathology of affluent societies.33  However  this is a  partial 
picture.  Much credit was used to upgrade assets that were perceived would increase in value (homes).  
The  liberal availability of consumer  credit and the housing boom during the late  1990s in the UK  
compensated for the downward pressure on wages  created by free trade and the ability since the 
1970s of capital to free itself of labour power, through for example the abolition of controls on the 
mobility of capital.  34  Free trade also provided  cheap imports which could be financed by credit. The 
rise of securitisation, linking the capital and credit markets, provided  a continuing demand from the 
capital markets for high yield consumer credit receivables, which would meet the needs of high short-
term returns in a shareholder driven capitalism.35While credit might lead to short term growth, this 
was consumption rather than investment driven and was  ultimately unstable.36  The sources of 
problems in the credit markets are primarily on the supply side of the market and a government 
committed to an economy driven by consumer credit.  
    II    Neo-Liberal Approaches to Regulation 
     Neo-liberal regulation promotes  access to consumer credit and the creation of  confidence in an 
expanding  and competitive consumer credit market. Consumer choice and the promotion of 
individual management and responsibility for one’s finances  are  assumptions guiding  regulation.  
Regulation within neo-liberalism assumes that consumer credit  is beneficial by  permitting  income 
smoothing over an individual’s life cycle, for example permitting younger consumers to accumulate 
assets during periods of low income and addressing temporary income deficits.37 Facilitating access to 
consumer credit may also contribute, albeit indirectly, to alleviating poverty in developing countries.38 
The promotion of fairness in credit contracts is not, in itself, incompatible with neo-liberalism since a 
fair market promotes confidence and expansion of the market. This was the underpinning for the 
                                                     
32  For a useful mainstream account see the UK Financial Services Authority Financial Risk Outlook (2009). 
33 See A Offer The Pathology of Affluence (Oxford, OUP, 2006). 
34  See Gowan (op cit), Graham Turner, Credit Crunch (2008) 
35 See Montgomerie op cit 
36 Economic growth under New Labour was  “sustained by high levels of consumption, which has been driven 
by easily available credit, which in turn has led to high levels of debt and insolvency…[d]emand has been 
driven by a consumption binge that was NICE while it lasted—but the hangover may be worse”  Consumption 
expenditure was driven by housing bubble and a ‘spend, spend, spend’ mentality’.M Kitson & F Wilkinson ‘The 
Economics of New Labour: policy and performance’ (2007) 31 Camb J Econ 805 at 811, 814. 
37 See World Bank (2008) Finance for All: Policies and Pitfalls in Extending Access (2008) c.3. See also  D. 
Karlan & J. Zinman “Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts” 
(2006) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982921(accessed 31.07.08).  
 
 38 See Karlan &  Zinman above.  
 
8 
 
overall structure of the UK Consumer Credit Act 1974 which included a mandatory licensing scheme 
for all credit providers.  
                     The central institutions  and policies advocated  for consumer credit markets within neo-
liberalism are: (1) credit bureaux and positive  credit reporting, (2) truth in lending, (3) financial 
literacy, and (4) financial ombudsmen.39 Securitization was also promoted as a measure to increase 
liquidity particularly in developing countries but the institutional structure of securitization created 
dangers for consumers and contributed to the instability of financial markets. Its future within  
consumer lending remains uncertain. The four  institutions outlined above respond to information 
asymmetries facing both suppliers and borrowers and are intended to recreate the conditions of  a 
perfect market.  Ombudsmen address   individual enforcement costs.  These regulations will create 
what the World Bank describes as the optimal “rules of engagement” for creditors and debtors.   This 
model assumes   that  it is possible to reduce the imbalance between consumers and providers by 
recreating the conditions of a neo-classical market—addressing informational market failures and 
redress costs. The premises of UK consumer policy (and the World Bank) are that the discipline of 
“empowered” consumers will drive a virtuous circle of increased competition, innovation and 
productivity.  
        Neo-liberalism is often  associated with individualised enforcement through private rights. 
However,  the need to maintain consumer confidence and the legitimacy of the credit system in the 
face of market failures and scandals often results in pressure for regulation and  what Harvey 
describes as the paradox  of  “intense state intervention” primarily through experts “ in a world where 
the state is supposed not to be interventionist”.40  In the UK there is   ex ante control of suppliers’ 
access to the market.41  
             A neo- liberal model must also deal with the inevitable problem of default in a society 
committed to high levels of credit.  In the business context the  World Bank, influenced by the law 
and finance literature, underlines the importance of clear and easily enforced creditor rights in 
encouraging  general credit availability.42It is relatively silent on the treatment of consumer 
overindebtedness. In the consumer context  the  potential social costs of overindebtedness for a debtor 
and  third parties may not be accurately  priced in the original transaction. If creditors are repeat 
players  and are able to develop systematic advantages in using the courts as part of a collection 
routine there is a danger that rapid enforcement which does not scrutinise closely the validity of the 
underlying debt will result in overlending and the sanctioning of sharp practice.43 The system for 
regulating default may affect the perimeters of credit although  the   empirical effects of debtor-
oriented or creditor-oriented rules  on secured and unsecured  consumer credit granting remains 
contested.  The US debtor oriented regime of  open access to consumer bankruptcy,  which  existed  
                                                     
39 See  The World Bank  Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy,  Good Practices for Consumer Protection 
and Financial Literacy in Europe and Central Asia - Consultative Draft (2008)  . See also “Slovakia: Technical 
Note on Consumer Protection in Financial Services Vol 1p3. This World Bank study relied on  EU Directives, 
the reports of European financial regulatory and supervisory agencies, the FTC and SEC, 2003 OECD 
Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Cross Border Fraud and the 1999 United Nations Guidelines on 
Consumer Protection. 
40  D. Harvey  A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism (Oxford: OUP) (2005) 
 41 Ibid., p. 163. 
 
42  For the law and finance literature see La Porta et al op citand for an application to a developing country. A 
Kumar, Access to Financial Services in Brazil (World Bank, 2005). 
43 This point was developed by T G Ison in Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection. 
9 
 
before the 2005 reforms  promised an early re-entry to the credit society for a debtor  and spread the 
costs of debt default  among private creditors, creating incentives for them to monitor consumer 
behaviour.  It co-existed with the most liberal credit regime in the world.  .                
         The detailed ground rules of consumer credit contract law  have an impact on  an individual’s 
bargaining power44 and create a model of   how each party should treat  the other throughout the 
transaction. The World Bank is relatively cursory in its discussion of the ground rules of consumer 
credit contracts. It recognises the necessity of ground rules for credit contracts, including controls on 
default rates as part of an effective consumer protection framework.  However  it  cautions that such 
regulation might restrict contractual freedom “to make contracts that may in some cases be more 
appropriate”.45                            
           Neo-liberalism  is sceptical of using market rules to redistribute the costs of market 
transactions, for example, through interest rate ceilings 46. Any redistribution  should be made by the 
state through the tax and transfer system. In addition, direct product regulation is shunned as a limit 
on innovation. . 
         Neo-liberalism does not mean therefore the  absence of regulation. Nor  is it limited to an 
“informational” approach to consumer protection.  This ideal type of  neo-liberalism  is often 
associated with Anglo-Saxon  (common law) jurisdictions such as the UK  and the US. French civil 
law jurisdictions, it is argued, are more likely to protect an individual from the market. However, in 
practice even within Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions  there are often political  pressure for  regulation of 
consumer credit. The elasticity of the market failure concept and the need to  respond to  scandals and 
outrages (e.g. concerns about “loan sharks”)  and maintain the legitimacy of the financial system may 
result  in a significant  regulatory response47.  In societies of high inequality such as the UK and the 
US, where low income consumers pay  much higher credit costs  than  middle class consumers, 
thereby undermining the impact of  state transfers,  the  legitimacy of the credit system  is always 
open to criticism.  
      Challenges for neo-liberalism 
1. Competition for innovation or exploitation of behavioural biases? 
         A neo-liberal model  assumes  that more competition is a good thing for consumer markets. But 
aggressive competition in the credit market poses challenges  for regulators.  Given the long term 
nature of many credit relationships and the often short term behavioural biases of consumers,  
competition may often focus on the short term costs and contingencies rather than long term or lower 
probability events such as  default costs.   The case of credit cards is a well known example where 
firms may exploit consumers’ behavioural biases--- individuals underestimate their future borrowing 
on cards—and  competition focuses on short term benefits such as no annual fees with high prices on 
                                                     
44  I have argued for this in  I Ramsay “Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare State (1995) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
45 World Bank (2008) Diagnostic Review Czech Republic at 9. 
46 See World Bank Finance for All? (note 8), pp. 160 and 179. 
47  For example, in the UK in the early 2000s, the media highlighted the case of a couple whose  mortgage loan 
had ballooned from £5000 to £348,000 because of compound interest on arrears. Questions were asked in 
Parliament and politicians promised to “do something” about “loan sharks”. 
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longer term contingencies such as borrowing costs and default charges.48 Bar-Gill has drawn attention 
to the potentially regressive and socially harmful aspects of this form of pricing. This  general 
structure of  pricing seems to exist in both prime and sub-prime consumer  credit markets and was a 
subject of much criticism in the early 2000s .49 The Competition Commission concluded that high 
cost payment protection insurance might be compensating for low margins on credit prices. 
         It is possible that what Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir  describe as “high road” firms—those who 
view themselves as good corporate citizens—may not wish to adopt these  pricing practices. 
However, they do so because they fear being at a  competitive disadvantage in a market where it is 
difficult to correct consumers short term preferences and convince them that an alternative product, 
for example a credit card with an annual fee and lower interest might be more suitable.50           The 
behavioural literature also challenges the view that consumer choices always reflect  consumer 
preferences. A common argument against regulation of sub-prime lending practices  such as payday 
loans is that it interferes with individual choice. But if choices do not always reflect preferences then  
the argument against regulation becomes weaker and undermines any  a priori presumptions against 
regulation based on abstract concepts such as markets versus regulation. A  close scrutiny of the 
potential harmful effects of biases in particular credit markets  particularly the higher  costs of credit 
mistakes for lower income consumers may justify regulation.  
       The behavioural  literature has  stimulated several distinct  policy responses. First,  there is  the 
search for debiasing interventions through more imaginative disclosures and the exploitation of  
behavioural findings to design more effective “choice architectures”51 for  consumers.  Although 
disclosure remains a central aspect of regulation there is much scepticism about the effectiveness of 
existing regulation and uncertainty as to what might work, particularly where consumers decision 
making problems are cognitive rather than informational52 .The application of  social science methods 
                                                     
48  See e.g. Bar Gill “Seduction by Plastic” discussed in Ramsay ch 10. For a  study on the effect of 
psychological factors in credit marketing see M. Bertrand, D. Karlan, S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir & J. Zinman 
(2005) ‘What’s Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market’ 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=770389 (accessed 29.7.2008) concluding that “even in a market setting with large 
stakes and experienced customers, subtle psychological features that normatively ought to have no impact 
appear to be extremely powerful drivers of behaviour”. See also R. Harris & E. Albin, ‘Bankruptcy Policy in 
Light of the Manipulation in Credit Advertising’ (2006) Theoretical Inquiries in Law pp. 431 et seq. 
49 See e.g. Bar-Gill on subprime pricing.  O Bar  Gill “The Law Economics and Psychology of Sub-Prime 
Mortgage Contracts” (2008) New York University Law and Economics Working Paper. On payment protection 
insurance see the Competition Commission in the UK . The pricing of overdrafts in the UK may also reflect 
these biases. See Office of Fair Trading, Personal Current Accounts in the UK, An OFT Market Study (October 
2008). 
50 See M Barr, S Mullainathan  and E Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Financial Regulation (New America 
Foundation, October 2008) 
51 See R.Thaler and C Sunstein Nudge (2008) for discussion of choice architectures. 
52  See for example National Consumer Council, Warning: Too Much Information can Harm ...(2007); S. 
Block-Lieb, R. Wiener, J.A. Cantone and M. Holtje (forthcoming 2009), ‘Disclosure as an Imperfect Means for 
Addressing Over-Indebtedness: An Empirical Assessment of Comparative Approaches’ in Niemi-Kiesilainen, 
Ramsay and Whitford  ,Consumer Credit: Debt and Bankruptcy: Comparative and International Perspectives 
(Oxford: Hart 2009); I. Ramsay (2005), ‘From Truth in Lending to Responsible Lending’ in G. Howells, A. 
Janssen & R. Schulze Information Rights and Obligations, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 48-57. In relation to 
disclosure in US sub-prime markets see L. Willis, ‘Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem 
of Predatory Lending: Price’ (2006) University of Maryland Law Review pp. 707 et seq. D. De Meza, B 
Irlenbusch D Reyniers, “Financial Capability: A Behavioural Economics Perspective” (Consumer Research 69) 
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to understanding and measuring policy alternatives does not promise clear solutions and may increase 
uncertainty as to what might work.  Second, information policies might be supplemented by  changing 
default rules,  requiring  a consumer to affirmatively opt in to an increase in a credit limit.  This 
approach retains consumer choice and autonomy, best described by  Sunstein and Thaler as a form of 
libertarian paternalism53.   Barr et al  propose  a“behaviourally informed financial regulation”. This 
would be a Third Way approach going beyond what they perceive as a traditional dichotomy between 
either reliance on disclosure regulation or the use of usury ceilings. Their approach takes into account 
both behavioural biases and market analysis.  They propose ” sticky” default rules  such as a 
standardised sub prime mortgage product without high costs attached to long term contingencies. 
Consumers could opt out but only if there are both heightened disclosures  and a substantial legal 
liability on the provider if the loan turns out to be  not appropriate for the borrower. This would 
permit innovation but only where it could be credibly explained to a potential borrower.  
        A third response to information deficits is greater standardisation of subsidiary terms in credit 
contracts where there is unlikely to be substantial competition between providers and/or where 
individuals are unlikely to be able to assess the risks of the term in advance.54 Standardisation already 
exists in some financial contracts  and the OFT has standardised default charges in credit cards.55 The 
argument that standardisation stifles innovation and limits consumer choice should not be discarded 
but  a greater burden might be placed on providers to substantiate these arguments. Standardisation 
might   represent  a “collective hands tying”. For example, in  an expanding competitive credit market 
few firms will stick to requiring downpayments from consumers even if individually they would deem 
it wise to do so. Finance Houses indicated to the Crowther committee that they supported the 
regulation of credit terms including required down payments in order to “protect a great many fools 
from their folly” but that they could not do so by voluntary agreement among themselves.56
     
2. Increased supply side information for profit maximisation or risk reduction and 
responsible lending? 
 Stiglitz and Weiss57 highlighted  the credit rationing effects of information asymmetry in credit 
markets. A major antidote to suppliers’  informational problem in consumer credit markets has been 
the development of credit scoring and credit bureaux. Sophisticated computer technology has 
substantially reduced creditors’ costs of storing and using credit information on an individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
FSA.  Research does suggest that consumers do use the APR to compare credit choices. See Ramsay, Consumer 
Law and Policy at 539; Bar-Gill, “Sub-Prime” at 57.  
53 C Sunstein and R Thaler “Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron” (2003) 70 U Chi LRev 1159. 
54 See e.g. in relation to credit cards Ronald Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment 
Card Markets (2007) at 143 et seq.  An example of  the latter is changing the interest rate on a card  
retroactively i.e. applying it to existing balances. See the recent  US Credit CARD ACT 2009  HR 627. 
55 Effectively reducing credit card penalty fees from £25 to£12. See OFT 842 Calculating Fair Default Charges 
in Credit Card Contracts (2006): Financial Times reported in 24 August 2006 that all 36 main credit card 
issuers had reduced their penalty fees to £12 in response to the OFT paper and threat to take further action 
against the previous level of default fees. The work of the OFT under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations has also resulted in greater standardisation of subsidiary terms. 
56  Crowther para 82.22. 
 57 J. Stiglitz & A. Weiss ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’ (1981) American 
Economic Review pp. 393 et seq. 
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creditworthiness. Standardised ‘credit-scoring’ systems for assessing creditworthiness have been 
developed by many major creditors. These techniques have facilitated the management of large 
numbers of small credit accounts – such as credit cards. Credit scoring has also facilitated ‘risk based 
pricing’ in the credit card market where credit card companies differentiate more finely between 
customers in relation to the level of interest payable on outstanding balances and use behavioural 
scorecards to determine whether to change interest rates on existing accounts.  
 The development of  credit bureaux and credit scoring are central planks in the World Bank’s vision 
of the development of credit markets58 and the UK government views better data sharing as an 
important  aspect of the control of over-indebtedness59. The Competition Commission concluded that 
better credit bureaux information on low income repayment patterns for home credit  would facilitate 
individuals’ access to lower cost credit60.  Article 8 of the EU Consumer Credit Directive indicates 
that credit databases should be consulted “when appropriate” by prospective lenders. 
            The perceived economic benefits of credit bureaux and credit scoring are well known61: better 
assessment of risks and reduction of bad debts, more accurate pricing of credit, and facilitating new 
entry by reducing the competitive advantages of incumbent banks, increased penetration among 
higher risk groups. There is an international distinction between positive and negative credit reporting, 
the former providing a relatively full picture of an individual’s payment history, the latter being 
limited to negative events such as bankruptcies, court judgment and defaults in payment.  
International financial interests and institutions have favoured positive credit reporting as a method of 
facilitating credit in developing countries and the entry of foreign financial institutions that can upset 
the informational advantages of local banks.62 Countries with negative credit reporting  e.g.[France, 
Australia] have lower levels of consumer credit outstanding than countries such as the UK and the 
US. Negative credit reporting may be expected to produce greater incentives to repay because in a 
positive system a borrower knows that one default may be discounted by a lender with a full picture 
of the financial position of the borrower.63  
                     Credit information is not merely used to minimise risk but also to maximise profits64. 
Information may be used by credit card companies to segment markets, develop “behavioural 
scorecards”  and  target consumers  who are likely to generate high profits through late payments and  
                                                     
58  See e.g. Finance For All, World Bank: World Bank, Doing Business Project ; M Miller Credit Reporting 
Systems in the International Economy (Cambridge Mass: MIT, 2003). For a discussion of credit information 
systems in Europe see F Ferreti The Law and Consumer Credit Information in the European Community 
(Routledge, London, 2008). 
59 See DBERR “Removing Constraints to the Sharing of Non-Consensual Credit Data” (February 2008) urn 
08/591. 
60 See Competition Commission Home Credit Inquiry http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2006/fulltext/517.pdf  . 
61  See ibid Appendix 2.1. for a summary of the benefits. 
62  See e.g. PERC Center for Competitive Credit “Economic Fairness Through Smarter Lending: Some Factors 
to Consider on the Eve of Brazilian Credit Reporting Reform”  (October 2007) A review of the current regime 
of negative credit reporting in Australia concluded that the benefits of moving to a positive credit reporting 
system had not been sufficiently substantiated to outweigh the potential costs in terms of privacy and other 
costs. See The Report of the Consumer Credit Review (2006) at 280. 
63  A Padilla & M Pagano (2000) “Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device” 44 European 
Economic Review 1951. 
64  See e.g. L Thomas, Consumer Credit Models; Pricing Profits and Portfolios (OUP: 2009). The description of 
this text indicates that “models allow one to make decisions that maximise the profitability of the borrower to 
the lender”. 
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borrowing on a card. Less profitable consumers may be terminated. Thus the Egg credit card company 
terminated contracts with those customers who did not use the card frequently and regularly paid off 
their balances.  Ronald Mann argues that through increased segmentation of the credit card market 
companies target some consumers with high fees while attempting to profit from higher income 
consumers through affinity cards with relatively high annual fees, whose benefits consumers often 
mistakenly assume outweigh their costs65 .  During the 1990s it was argued in the UK  that credit 
scoring was used in the UK to exclude individuals from mainstream markets and facilitated the 
development of sub-prime lending.66 Most recently credit card companies  use risk based pricing to 
change the interest rate (sometimes by as much as 10%) for existing holders of cards. 
                Extensive information sharing may facilitate a deeper consumer credit market but not 
necessarily result in lower levels of indebtedness or even default. One study   claims that ‘countries 
with positive registries such as the UK, the US and Sweden…have high levels of indebtedness’67. 
These comments suggest some ambiguity about the overall effects of more creditor information: 
greater competition that could create incentives to ‘oversell’, more  access to credit but not necessarily 
a reduction in the level of default. Positive credit reporting therefore has ambiguous effects: more 
lending, to possibly higher risk consumers  but also the possibility of higher defaults as lenders use 
scoring as a method of increasing profitability rather than reducing risk.  
          Credit scoring also facilitates forms of lending where lending is centralized, staff costs are 
reduced through the absence of face-to-face contact through branches and credit processing is 
computerized. This may reduce the possibility of determining whether credit is suitable or appropriate 
to the needs of a particular individual rather than the profit maximisation of the lender There is 
therefore a tension between this form of credit granting and the development of an  individualised 
responsible lending standard.68   
           There is remarkably little “hard” regulation of several aspects of credit bureaux and credit 
scoring practices in the UK69  notwithstanding their central role in segmenting, including and 
excluding individuals from the credit market. . 
3. Upskilling consumers   through financial literacy?                
          During the past 10 years governments, other regulators and international institutions have 
joined with financial firms to promote financial literacy as a core element of consumer financial 
services market regulation. This development illuminates how neoliberal policy-making organises 
consumer protection policy around individualization, responsibilization and market expansion. In 
2003, the OECD launched a “Financial Education Project”, sponsored by Prudential plc’s corporate 
responsibility program.  Fuelled by beliefs that uneducated consumers cannot cope with the expansion 
of financial markets and the increased complexity of financial products, and by concerns about the 
                                                     
65 See Mann above at 137-138. 
66 See D Burton, D Knights, A Leyshon, C Alferoff & P Signoretta “Making a Market: the UK Retail Financial 
Services Industry and the Rise of the Complex Sub-Prime Credit Market” (2004) 8 Competition and Change 
3.at 12-13 “complex sub-prime providers actually use much more sophisticated credit rating technologies 
through differential pricing according to the risk profile. This ensures that they make a profit regardless of the 
level of risk”. 
67 European Credit Research Institute (2003) “Briefing on consumer credit, indebtedness and overindebtedness” 
prepared for the  European Parliament Hearing on the Consumer Credit Directive 29 April 2003. (Brussels 
ECRI) p.5.  
68 See Consumer Credit Directive art5. 
69  Primarily located in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and the 1998 Data Protection Act 
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consequences of consumers spending too much and saving too little, this project encourages countries 
to develop effective regulatory policies to enhance financial literacy. Its publications, which include a 
substantial report on financial literacy education and a policy paper to guide countries in the 
development of educational programmes,70 characterise financial illiteracy as an urgent and pervasive 
problem for financial markets, and represent literate financial consumers as ‘regulatory subjects’ 
whose decisions will increase price competition among suppliers and stimulate innovation.71 Bolder 
claims also appear in the Report to the effect that financially literate consumers will improve 
economic growth in all types of economies, as well as help to reduce poverty and potentially moderate 
the volatility of financial markets in emerging economies.72  
Recent national initiatives to promote financial literacy (or financial capability) include: Australia’s 
Consumer and Financial Literacy Task Force (2004) which led to the establishment of the Financial 
Literacy Foundation in 2005; L’institut pour l’Education Financière du Public (IEFP) created in 
France in 2006; the New Zealand Retirement Commission’s “Sorted” programme, the U.S. Federal 
Government’s Financial Literacy and Education Commission,73 and the U.K’s National Financial 
Capability strategy (2003), a multi-agency programme of consumer enhancement that is led by the 
FSA and heavily backed by HM Treasury.74 Although the particular mandates and specific  goals of 
these initiatives vary, it is common for their work to be characterised as “empowering consumers” at a 
minimum through the provision of information, the development of financial skills and the activation 
of a consumers’ sense of financial responsibility.75 These policy initiatives link the enhancement of 
consumers’ financial capabilities to their responsibilization through the idea that financial literacy 
improves the capacity of consumers to protect themselves against risks of “mis-buying” and mis-
selling of financial products.  A second important linkage is the idea that financial literacy fuels 
demand for financial products as consumers become more active and more self-reliant – that is, more 
self-regulating – about how they manage income smoothing and their future economic security.  As 
consumers become more capable and therefore responsible they in turn are supposed to reduce the 
need for regulatory intervention.  
                                                     
70 OECD, Improving financial literacy: analysis of issues and policy (OECD Publishing, Washington 2005); 
OECD 'Recommendation on Principles and Good Practices for Financial Education and Awareness' (2005) 
71 Ibid Improving Financial Literacy at 35. For extensive discussion of the financial consumer as regulatory 
subject, see Williams, Toni, 'Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education 
and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services' (2007) 29(2) Law & Policy 226. 
72 .(OECD, 2005a, p. 35) 
73 This agency was established under Title V, the Financial Literacy and Education Improvement Act, which 
was part of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act of 2003. Its functions are to: “coordinate the 
financial education efforts throughout the federal government, support the promotion of financial literacy by the 
private sector while also encouraging the synchronization of efforts between the public and private sectors.” 
There is a vast array of state, private and NGO financial literacy initiatives in the US, most are very recent, e.g. 
a 2006 report found that only about one in four US financial literacy programmes started before the late 1990s, 
Financial Literacy and Education Commission, Taking Ownership of the Future:  The National Strategy for 
Financial Literacy, (Washington:  Financial Literacy and Education Commission, 2006) p. 97.  
74  Financial Services Authority, 'Building financial capability in the UK' FSA (2003); Financial Services 
Authority, Building financial capability in the UK (FSA, London 2003); Financial Services Authority, 'Towards 
a national strategy for financial capability' FSA (2003); HM Treasury 'Financial Capability: The Government's 
long-term approach' (2007) ; HM Treasury and Financial Services Authority 'Helping You Make the Most of 
Your Money: A Joint Action Plan for Financial Capability' (2008)  
75 e.g. (Basic Skills Agency & Financial Services Authority, 2003, p. 4) (Financial Services Authority, 2003c, p. 
5). (Financial Services Authority, 2003a) headlines its section titled “What we want to achieve” with “We share 
a vision of better informed, educated and more confident citizens, able to take greater responsibility for their 
financial affairs and play a more active role in the market for financial services”, at 2. 
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Financial literacy has become almost  an international crusade and it is difficult to find balanced 
discussion of its role in financial services. The idea of “responsibilizing” consumers by upgrading 
their financial capabilities  fits neatly into strategies of governance in neoliberalism where  suitably 
upgraded consumers in the credit market will become part of the supposed virtuous circle of driving 
competition, innovation and productivity in financial services. Consumers will also, it is argued, be 
able to avoid the problems of overindebtedness through better financial management.  Financial 
literacy  has become part of the professional discourse of policy makers and the helping professions.  
There remains however much that is untested in the financial literacy literature and  a review of 
behavioural finance suggests that it is not absence of information but  behavioural biases which cause 
consumers to make repeated mistakes in credit markets76.              
4. Low cost redress: financial ombudsmen 
          A financial ombudsman  disposes of disputes between consumers, small businesses and 
financial institutions. The financial ombudsman  has become an international institution, since its 
emergence in the UK in the early 1980s.77  Its characteristics are its ability to determine issues on 
broad fairness grounds, specialist knowledge,  the absence of costs to consumers, the requirement for 
firms to develop internal complaint systems, and the possibility of identifying patterns of misconduct 
which can be addressed by regulators.  An ombudsman can be therefore part of a meta-regulatory 
strategy to ensure the responsiveness of large organisations.  
         Experience in the UK indicates that   the FOS has  provided a useful service to primarily middle 
and upper middle class consumers 78.   The FOS now has a large caseload with 127,000 new cases in 
2008 and 8,674 cases resolved. ..[to be concluded]   
              
    III.  A Consumer Credit Safety Commission?  The UK Regulatory Triangle  
          Bar-Gill and Warren  proposed a  “new deal” consumer credit safety commission which would  
provide ex ante  credit product regulation,  with  the possibility of rulemaking and regulation of  the 
product rather than particular sellers.79  This model has been adopted by the Obama administration in 
the   proposal to establish  a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency80. A variation on this model 
already  exists in the UK  where the  OFT  licenses unsecured credit providers  and the FSA secured 
credit providers.  Both the OFT and the FSA now have the power to  monitor and regulate the 
business model of credit providers and the addition of irresponsible lending to the criteria for licence 
revocation provides the OFT with a significant lever for regulating lending practices throughout the 
course of a transaction. 81
                                                     
76 See De Meza et al op cit. 
77  See discussion in Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy Oxford Hart (2d ed) 2007 at 239-254. 
78 The 2008 Annual Review indicates increasing numbers of consumers using the service in the C1 and C2 
categories reflecting the growth of its consumer credit jurisdiction and the decline in mortgage endowment 
cases. 
79 “Making Credit Safer” op cit. 
80 For the details  see the US White Paper of June 17 2009 “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation” 
at 55et seq 
81 The  2006  amendments to the 1974 Act now permit the OFT to take into account the business model of a firm 
in assessing its fitness to hold a licence and  “irresponsible lending” is included as a  criterion in  deciding 
whether to  grant or revoke a credit licence. See CCA s25 (2), (2A(e) and (2B). The OFT is under an obligation 
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           Credit  licensing by the OFT in the UK had both efficiency and   distributional objectives. 
From an efficiency perspective licensing  compensated for general information and enforcement costs 
facing consumers.  The distributional goal  was the  protection of  lower income and vulnerable 
consumers who  would have difficulties in seeking individual remedies against unfair credit practices.  
The licensing provisions under the 1974 Act  did confer broad powers on the OFT to police “unfair 
practices” irrespective of whether they were proscribed by law. The Annual Reports of the OFT 
during the 1980s and 90s indicates that they used the licensing process as a method of identifying 
unfair practices,  for example developing guidelines on unfair practices in the sub-prime (non-status) 
lending market. These practices included irresponsible lending, the use of dual interest rates, and 
negative option selling of credit insurance. The licensing process did function therefore as a nascent 
form of industry rulemaking of credit products. The perception was however that the OFTs 
information gathering and  enforcement powers and practices were not  effective and that the agency 
was underresourced . Although self-regulation also developed during this period, its coverage was 
least effective in higher risk lending.  There was also little political support for the OFT during the 
1990s while the Conservative government was in power.  Indeed reform  during this period focused 
on whether the costs of licensing (overinclusive and costly to administer) outweighed its benefits82.  
In contrast the regulatory impact analysis for the 2006 amendments to the CCA  concluded that the 
costs to consumers and reputable businesses from deregulation would far outweigh  the costs saved 
through deregulation.83   
 
 
COMPARISON OF POWERS OF OFT/FSA WITH  PROPOSED US CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 
        
 CFPA  OFT FSA 
Rulemaking  
 
√√ √ √√ 
Monitoring/Supervision √ √ √ 
Ex ante Licensing  for √ √ √ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to provide guidance on the fitness test (s25A),.Under s26 it may make conduct of business regulations.. The 
OFT has  intermediate powers to impose requirements on a licensee where it is dissatisfied with the manner in 
which it is carrying on its business [s33A] and it has used these powers to   impose conditions on debt collectors 
and on Citibank’s standard form credit contract which excluded liability under s75 for overseas  purchases.  The 
Office is to prepare guidance on how it proposes to exercise these powers [33E] The Office also has information 
gathering [36C] and power to require access to observe the carrying on of business and to inspect documents 
[36C].  The Office proposes a  risk assessment approach to credit licensing so that it  can focus on higher risk 
areas such as debt collection, debt management  and sub-prime lending. Sub-prime and home lenders will be 
required to provide a credit risk profile to ensure that they are not lending irresponsibly. See “Consumer Credit 
Licensing” (OFT 969, January 2008)   
      The FSA rule-making powers are found in Part X of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
82 See discussion in Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy (2d ed) at499 et seq 
83 See  Consumer Credit Bill Full Regulatory Impact Assessment at 48-49. 
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safety, fairness 
Enforcement √ √ √ 
“Outcomes based 
approach” 
√ ? √ 
Measures to ensure 
responsiveness to 
consumer interests 
√ √ √ 
Funding by industry partly Licensing activity funded √ 
Separate from prudential 
regulator? 
√ √ X 
Promoting  Credit Access 
to underserved groups 
√ x ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  The OFT  has also engaged in credit industry  rulemaking through its general power to 
enforce unfair contract terms under the UTCC regulations implementing the EU Directive. Thus it has 
set the terms for default rates on credit cards and currently is engaged in regulation of overdraft 
charges.84  
             The new OFT licensing model is based on the licensing powers of the  Financial Services 
Authority whose  jurisdiction  since 2004 includes  first charge mortgages and  credit insurance. Retail 
financial services are regulated through conduct of business rules but in recent years the FSA adopted 
what regulatory scholars describe  as a meta-regulatory approach,  requiring financial firms to embed 
general principles  such as “treating customers fairly” within their  business model and organisational 
culture.  It now refers to this form of regulation as  “outcomes based” regulation  and treating 
customers fairly requires a number of “consumer outcomes”85. These include: “consumers can be 
confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of customers is central to corporate 
culture and is automatically taken into account in all relevant business decisions”; “products and 
services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to meet the needs of identified consumer 
groups and are targeted accordingly”: and “consumers are provided with products that perform as 
firms have led them to expect and the associated service is both of an acceptable standard and as they 
have been led to expect”.   The FSA expects fair treatment to be “established throughout the firm not 
just in systems and controls but in business culture including strategy, training, remuneration, and 
                                                     
84 See discussion in Ramsay “Consumer Law and Policy” op cit at 476-485. 
85 See FSA “Treating Customers Fairly: Measuring Outcomes” (2007) which lists the six consumer outcomes. 
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staff behaviours”. Senior management must have adequate information to monitor TCF. Firms must 
not rely solely on consumer satisfaction studies to determine whether there is fair treatment of 
consumers since consumers may be satisfied with an unsuitable product and dissatisfied with a fair 
product.  The FSA’s approach does not depend on prescriptive rules and  action against deviant firms 
but is intended to embed attentiveness to consumer welfare into the working rules of financial product 
design, development and marketing and financial contract formation, performance, complaint 
handling and redress.  While this approach  ultimately harnesses self-regulation the FSA has been  
active in  inspecting firms  to identify progress with its initiative and  taking enforcement action where 
it identifies significant violations of the principles.  
          The FSA has  been active in its regulation of the sub-prime credit industry since taking over this 
jurisdiction in 2004.  In   2005 the FSA  highlighted to firms the importance of  making a suitability 
assessment  and treating consumers fairly when selling payment protection insurance86.  The 2005 
review  concluded that many firms visited had inadequate documentation to demonstrate suitability 
when advising on mortgage products.  The Authority responded through individual feedback, a “dear 
CEO letter” and enforcement actions.  In 2007 it conducted a further  review of  substantial numbers 
of lenders and intermediaries in  the sub prime lending  market . The review revealed that in the case 
of intermediaries one third of files showed an inadequate assessment of consumers' ability to afford 
the mortgage and in  almost half  the files there was an inadequate assessment of customers' suitability 
for the mortgage. “Significant numbers of consumers were advised to re-mortgage, thereby incurring 
early repayment charges, without the adviser being able to demonstrate that this was beneficial to the 
customer. None of the lenders adequately covered all relevant responsible lending considerations in 
their policies” and “ there were also failings by lenders to monitor the application of their policies, 
which resulted in the approval of potentially unaffordable mortgages.” Five firm were referred for 
enforcement action. 
               Payment protection insurance which is often sold with sub prime loans87 and  is part of the 
business model of selling sub-prime credit88 has been a  target of  FSA regulation. Problems with 
misselling were identified in the 2005 visits to firms in the sub-prime market and from 2006  the  FSA  
took  high profile  action against  large institutions such as HFC, GE Capital and Citigroup  [Egg 
Credit Card] concerning the misselling  of credit insurance.89  HFC (Household Finance) a subsidiary 
of  HSBC  was fined  over £1 million for its misselling practices. It sold single premium insurance  
with 75% of its consumer loans which are primarily made  to working class and lower middle income 
consumers. The investigation  by the FSA of its internal practices revealed that its  procedures for 
training and monitoring staff were inadequate and that these resulted in an “unacceptable risk of 
unsuitable sales”. The need to monitor staff was heightened by the existence of  a bonus structure for 
meeting sales targets of PPI.  In addition to a substantial fine, HFC undertook an  independent audit of 
its compliance and contacted consumers who may have been missold insurance to identify possible 
                                                     
86  See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/095.shtml 
87  See Competition Commission Market Investigation intoPayment Protection Insurance  at para 11 “PPI 
Consumers are more likely to earn less than the national average income or come from socio-economic groups 
C and D”  
88  The practice of finance companies selling insurance with credit is known in the US as “insurance packing” 
“shoving as much insurance onto the customer as possible without the customer’s knowledge or without the 
customer’s understanding” Statement of “Jim Dough” to Hearings Before the Special Committee on Aging US 
Senate (105th Congress) (2d Session) (March 16 1998). 
89 The FSA took action against 20 firms for poor selling practises in relation to PPI. See 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/031.shtml. 
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compensation. 90 The report of the FSA action also revealed the business model of HFC which  
involved  much refinancing of loans   which provided opportunities for selling larger loans, more 
insurance, and  settlement fees.  The FSA has now required all firms  not to sell single premium 
payment protection insurance.91  A consequence of these and other investigations (by the Competition 
Commission) is that payment protection insurance may no longer be a  major supra-normal profit 
centre for financial institutions. 92 The demise of single premium ppi might be analogised to recall of 
a potentially dangerous product.      
            There are several points of interest in the FSAs approach to regulation. First, it is a form of ex 
ante regulation in the sense that firms must not market dangerous products or have marketing 
structures that create an unreasonable risk of misselling. Second, the regulator opens  up the black box 
of corporate decision making, requiring firms to develop a business model which does not create this 
unacceptable risk..   Third,, the FSA  has significant informational and monitoring powers. Firms 
must make monthly reports and are subject to audit visits particularly if they are operating in a 
potentially higher risk sector. Fourth, the agency has the power to award redress and in a number of 
cases required companies to write to existing customers with policies outlining the possibility of 
redress.93  Fifth,  the FSA has  gradations of penalties ranging  from informal feedback, “dear CEO 
letters”, through financial  penalties and the possibility of licence revocation.   
           The FSA approach  is a potentially promising model of consumer credit regulation.  However 
we are aware of potential criticisms . First, Baldwin has pointed to the difficulties of regulators 
attempting to  harness internal organisational structures where there may be confusion and conflict 
over roles and a tension between shareholder return and regulatory risk.94  The continued misselling 
of ppi by large “reputable” organizations after being warned of the dangers by the regulator and in 
some cases the receipt of a “Dear CEO” letter might support Baldwin’s argument or simply suggest 
that these firms were amoral calculators and therefore unlikely to be able to change their culture.   
Second, there is the perennial problem of  “capture” of agencies by particular interests.   This concern 
has underpinned much UK regulatory thinking during the past decade with the growth of a variety of 
accountability mechanisms within government  and  in  the case of the FSA the existence of the 
Financial Services Consumer Panel.95. There is little evidence of capture of the agency by any single  
interest group and the capture theory does not in any event  adequately describe the complex 
interdependence between powerful actors in particular regulatory spaces where “no single actor can 
hope to dominate the regulatory process”96.    
           There is also  the role of the FOS and the OFT  within the regulatory structure. The former can 
play an informational role in identifying potentially unfair credit  practices in its dispute settlement 
work and  acting as a catalyst for regulatory action. Financial service companies must  establish 
                                                     
90  The decision indicates: “As a result of the review HFC is in the process of making a significant number of 
changes to its sales processes. It has also agreed to strengthen its compliance monitoring and oversight 
arrangements. HFC has also committed to a robust remedial action plan, overseen by third party accountants, 
involving a programme of customer contact and, if appropriate, steps to ensure that its customers are not 
disadvantaged.” 
91“FSA wants all firms to stop selling single premium PPI”  
24 February 2009 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/031.shtml 
92 The Competition Commission calculated a return on equity of 490 percent for ppi. See Competition 
Commission Final Report Payment Protection Insurance (29 January 2009). 
93 See e.g. Final Notice Egg Credit Card  9 December 2008. 
94 R Baldwin, “The New Punitive Regulation” (2004) 67 MLR 351. 
95 See ss8 and 10 FSMA 2000.  
96  Black, 2002 at 00. 
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appropriate complaints procedures.   The existence of the OFT with some overlapping jurisdiction 
provides  the possibility of regulatory competition and the existence of regulatory redundancy. This  
UK regulatory triangle  is complemented by the existence of  the “supercomplaints” process which 
permits consumer groups to place issues [such as ppi] on the regulatory agenda97.   Third regulators, 
like consumers, might also be affected by behavioural biases with the danger that they were 
overconfident in their judgments, responding to highly visible (though not necessarily  serious) issues. 
There are however significant controls on this in contemporary UK regulation through the 
requirements of RIAs, treasury oversight etc. 
                      A key question is the regulation of “new” products, balancing protection against the 
value of fostering innovation.  For example, how should an agency react to novel products such as 
payday loans or equity release mortgages where there may be uncertainty as to who will benefit? One 
possibility would be to apply a  precautionary principle to a new product with an initial burden on 
credit providers to indicate the benefits of the product . The application of this  principle to credit 
products might possibly have protected  consumers against some of the initial problems with equity 
release products. There is always the danger here  that existing firms may oppose new entrants (at 
least until they are able to determine whether it is worth developing the product).  
           The effectiveness of credit safety licensing depends on  high quality information to identify  
potentially unsafe credit products and the ability to devise a regulation that can achieve an optimal 
level of safety without unnecessarily decreasing  the availability of credit or innovation. Experience of 
consumer safety regulation indicates that private groups inevitably play an important role in 
information gathering and standard setting in regulation.  Establishing product safety standards is a 
complex blend of technical expertise and responsiveness to political pressures  The FSA is in a 
continuing dialogue with its stakeholders so that there is the  potential to blend both technical 
expertise and political responsiveness.  
             The increasing use of broad standards such as responsible lending98 also argue in favour of 
the FSA approach. A standard such as  responsible lending is subject to the critique that it may 
increase costs (e.g. legal advice) and  uncertainty for lenders which may in turn result in a hesitate to 
lend to more marginal credit risks.  Reliance on private litigation to develop  the concept of 
responsible lending suffers from several drawbacks; the difficulties of courts establishing useful 
standards to be applied within bureaucratic organizations: the reactivity and  lack of expertise of 
courts,  and knowledge about how to change organizational behaviour: the  likelihood of being subject 
to the biases of  the litigation strategies of repeat players. The experience of standard setting to protect 
bank loan guarantors illustrates these limitations. A public regulator will be in a better position to 
develop guidance, encourage the development of best practices within an industry and monitor the 
potentially changing nature of  the concept of responsible lending.  
             Regulation is inevitably affected by the political climate towards regulation.   It may be 
difficult for an agency to maintain a cautious approach during a market upswing. One method of 
compensating for this might be  the UK supercomplaint procedure99 which permits consumer groups 
                                                     
97 See s11 Enterprise Act 2002. Supercomplaints have been made in relation to ppi, home credit and credit card 
practices. 
98 A form of responsible lending is implicit in article 5.6 of the 2008 EU Consumer Credit Directive currently 
being implemented in the UK. 
99  Supra  
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to require an agency to respond to a potential market problem, permitting such groups to set the 
regulatory agenda.     
        Does the UK structure provide a model for drawing on both  public and private actors  in the area  
of consumer credit and achieving efficient and fair markets through regulation which is both effective 
and accountable?  This is an important contemporary question as scholars compare European and US 
approaches to regulation in a number of areas and the Obama administration propose an agency 
similar to the FSA. Further comparative analysis would be beneficial in this area although there are 
substantial difficulties in carrying out such research.100   The UK model seems at first sight distinct 
from the stylised  description of  US consumer protection based on regulation through litigation, the 
central role of “lawyer entrepreneurs” and a culture of adversarial legalism101.  
                            
IV  Conclusion  
              There  are significant limits on consumers as “ a market discipline” in credit markets, even if 
suitably responsibilized through financial literacy . There is  therefore the need for greater controls on 
the supply side of the market in terms of regulating both fairness and the type and manner of product 
marketing. We have suggested that a suitably resourced FSA or OFT has the potential to meet this 
need. .   Regulation  promises  greater fairness, perhaps slightly lower prices and greater choice  for 
lower income consumers. Fairness within this approach does not  however prevent  the Poor from  
paying  more than middle income consumers for credit. In addition, the ultimate objective of 
promoting confidence in an expanding market for credit assumes that the promotion of access even at 
very high prices  rather than protection from credit is the starting point for analysis. The assumption 
that credit is “a good thing” will prevent any broad  scale measures such as  interest rate ceilings,  or 
terms control which would dampen demand. Of course it is precisely this issue of how much credit is 
“a good thing” which is raised by the credit crunch. 
          Affordable access to credit for low income consumers, particularly for short term loans remains 
a  problem. A recent history of working class credit concludes that “cheap credit remains elusive for 
the depressingly large number of families who still have to manage on limited budgets...unfortunately 
the liberalization of credit that accompanied the great leap into the consumer society has not produced 
a simple solution for the economic problems of the poorest groups. For them easy terms remain 
elusive.”    The UK government in response to the credit crunch is now promoting the mutual sector 
including building societies and  credit unions as methods of  providing and alternative to the 
mainstream banks. 102  Crowther noted in 1970 that  “mutual aid ...” was not part of the British 
tradition in credit compared with the growth of credit unions in other countries.” Historically, apart 
from building societies before they were demutualized,  there has been a relative absence of non-
                                                     
100  See Howell Jackson on the difficulties of comparative analysis of  the effectiveness of enforcement of 
securities legislation. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J.REGULATION 253 (2007) . One of the authors has drawn 
attention to the difficulties of comparing consumer bankruptcy across jurisdictions. I Ramsay, Comparative 
Consumer Bankruptcy (2007) Illinois LRev 241. 
101  See  F Cafaggi and Hans-W Micklitz “Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: 
The Way Forward EUI Working Papers  Law 2008-09. 
102  See Treasury Financial Inclusion 2008-11 at  2.11 where support for third sector lenders is “ at the heart” of 
government strategy to provide affordable access. 
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market institutions providing credit. In the 19th century private pawnbrokers were known as the poor 
man’s bank and  hire-purchase,  moneylenders, and home collected credit provided working class 
credit.           We  have the impression that the UK has tended to assume that its approach to credit and 
regulation reflects a more “modern” and rational approach than countries such as Germany and 
France. The credit crunch has clearly challenged that assumption and further comparative work within 
Europe may deepen our understanding of the nature and role of consumer credit and the effects of 
different forms of regulation. 
 
Appendix 1 : Fines imposed on firms selling PPI for TCF failures, 2006-2008. 
 
 
Year Firm Amount Summary 
2006-09 Regency Mortgage £56,000 Failures in mortgage related PPI sales in the sub 
prime market 
2006-10 Loans.co.uk Limited  
(LCUK) 
£455,000 PPI selling failures 
2006-11 Capital Mortgage 
Connections Ltd (CMC) 
£17,500 Breaches including cold calling potential customers 
and PPI failings 
2006-12 Redcats (Brands) Ltd £270,000 Failing to treat customers fairly when selling Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) in connection with home 
shopping products 
2006-12 Home and County 
Mortgages Limited 
(HCML)
£52,500 Management failures and a lack of skill, care and 
diligence 
2007-01 G.E. Capital Bank £610,000 Systems and controls failings in selling insurance 
including Payment Protection Insurance, and failing 
to treat its customers fairly. 
2007-02 Capital One Bank 
(Europe) plc
£175,000 Not having adequate systems and controls in place to 
sell payment protection insurance and for failing to 
treat its customers fairly. 
2007-09 Hadenglen Home 
Finance
£133,000 For inadequate systems and controls when 
recommending re-mortgages and Payment Protection 
Insurance (PPI) to customers. 
2007-09 Richard Hayes, Chief 
Director of Hadenglen
£49,000 For inadequate systems and controls when 
recommending re-mortgages and Payment Protection 
Insurance (PPI) to customers. 
2008-01 HFC Bank Ltd. £1,085,000 For failing to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
advice it gave customers to buy Payment Protection 
Insurance (PPI) was suitable, and for failing to have 
adequate systems and controls for the sale of PPI. 
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Year Firm Amount Summary 
2008-05 Land of Leather £210,000 For allowing its sales force to sell PPI on loans 
without effective monitoring or training in place to 
ensure that the insurance was being sold fairly 
2008-05 Mr. Briant in relation to 
Land of Leather
£14,000 For failing to properly oversee the sale of PPI by 
Land of Leather Limited 
2008-07 Liverpool Victoria 
Banking services
£840,000 For serious failings in the sale of single premium 
Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) 
2008-08 GK Group Limited £51,100 for serious breaches relating to the sale of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) 
2008-08 George White Motors 
Ltd.
£28,000 for serious breaches relating to the sale of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) 
2008-08 Park’s of Hamilton 
Holdings Ltd
£61,600 for serious breaches relating to the sale of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) 
2008-08 Ringways Garages 
(Leeds) Limited & 
Ringways Garages 
(Doncaster) Limited
£35,000 for serious breaches relating to the sale of Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI) 
2008-09 Alliance and Leicester £7,000,000 for serious failings in its telephone sales of payment 
protection insurance 
2008-12 Egg Banking plc £721,000 For serious failings in its sales of credit card payment 
protection insurance (PPI). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 The UK and France: Contrasting approaches to regulation? 
Is  UK credit regulation  a neo-liberal model ? 
                    The UK is  often identified as a neo-liberal country notwithstanding New Labour’s claim 
to stake a “Third Way” in policy making by  blending the market with  social values.  Government 
policy views consumer credit   as a  beneficial product and the maximum number of consumers 
should  have access to credit.  This public policy  can  be traced to the influential  Crowther report in 
1970 which established the “post-war orthodoxy on credit”103. This report, chaired by an economist 
and former editor of The Economist  argued for a “competitive environment which  will ...offer every 
incentive for innovation and experiment”.   The starting point for the report was that the “state should 
interfere as little as possible with the consumer’s freedom to use his knowledge of the consumer credit 
                                                     
103  See G Borrie, “The Credit Society: Its Benefits and Burdens” (1986) Journal of Business Law 181. 
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market to the best of his ability and according to his judgment of what constitutes his best interests”. 
104  Policy should not attempt to limit freedom of access but should help the “minority who innocently 
get into trouble to manage their financial affairs more successfully...the basic principle of social 
policy must therefore be to reduce the number of defaulting debtors”.   
            According to Crowther consumer protection legislation would primarily address market failure 
caused by information with licensing of creditors as both a control on unfairness and a limited 
distributional goal of protecting low income consumers who would have difficulties in protecting 
themselves through individual litigation. The Committee endorsed some risk and loss spreading in 
protections for defaulting debtors.  The introduction of connected lender liability was justified partly 
by noting that “in considering which of two relatively innocent parties should bear the greater loss, it 
is much easier for the business creditor to do so than the individual debtor.”  The Committee was 
however concerned that this risk spreading should not go too far since it would result in the “good 
customer” subsidising the “bad customer”.   The Committee concluded that there was little that 
consumer protection policy could do for the poor except provide protection against hardships caused 
by repossession and the enforcement of judgments.  Even here the committee was concerned that 
“every restriction on a creditor’s remedy must be paid for”.   Fairness rather than subsidised 
redistribution was the objective.   
          The Committee did assume that consumer credit existed within the backdrop of a welfare state 
and that individuals should not have to meet basic needs by borrowing at interest rates over 100 per 
cent.  This problem should be solved through “social welfare services rather than by the granting of 
loans at enormous interest rates” [para 6:6.6].  The subsequent CCA 1974 legitimised consumer 
credit. It would hopefully eliminate the fly by night from the market (through the licensing regime) 
and many large credit grantors supported the Act.  Regulation was a pre-condition for the 
development of a mass market for consumer credit and the Act was enacted by a conservative 
government.  
                Between the 1970s and 2003 there was a transition  from producerism to consumerism in  
politics so that increasingly it is the consumer who is conceptualised as the primary legitimator and 
beneficiary of policymaking.  105  The  growth of secured and unsecured consumer credit was  
facilitated through the abolition of terms control on hire-purchase and the Bank of  England  “corset” 
on lending, the liberalization of housing finance and the ability to use home equity as a  source of 
general financing. This “democratisation” of credit   could be viewed as representing  a neo-liberal 
vision of the empowered  consumer with a right to choose---a project carried on by New Labour with 
its emphasis on ‘extending choice for the many, not the few’ [Blair, 2003].  David  Harvey argues that 
these changes in financial services provision  brought “ more and more of a debt culture into the 
centre of a formerly staid British life” (Harvey, 2005: 61-62).    There was also a growth in inequality 
during this period and consumer credit could substitute for relatively stagnant income growth. The 
“sub prime” market  such as  doorstep lending substantially increased during this period.  Given the 
defining role attributed to consumption and consumerism in contemporary society, inequality in the 
price of access to consumption because of high  credit costs  takes on an increased salience and 
affordable access to credit has become an important –but tantalisingly difficult to achieve—objective.  
                                                     
104  For general background on development of consumer credit see I Ramsay, Consumer Law and Policy: Text 
and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets (Oxford, Hart 2d ed 2007) ch 10. 
 105 Whitman, James Q. (2007)  ‘Consumerism versus Producerism: On the Global Menace of “Consumerism” 
and the Mission of Comparative Law’ 117 Yale LJ 340 
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 During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s the redistributional aspects of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 were  the least effective. Credit licensing was perceived to have failed to protect 
subprime consumers and the vague “extortionate credit bargain” provisions—regarded as a substitute 
for interest rate ceilings—were little protection against high credit prices in the sub-prime market. 
Leyson and Thrift documented the growth of financial exclusion in the 1990s as financial institutions 
withdrew from low income neighborhoods. Any reform proposals during this period were primarily 
deregulatory and a review of the Act in 1994 commented that “perhaps the greatest strength of the Act 
is that it does not seek to meet its objectives through interventionist actions such as interest rate 
capping or direct control of the substance of contracts. Rather it explicitly endorses freedom of 
contract within a framework designed to ensure openness: consumer protection is attained in large 
part  through measures to ensure that full and truthful information about credit contracts is available to 
consumers”. [OFT, 1994] The major beneficiaries of the Act were middle class consumers  who used 
credit cards and could take advantage of the connected lender provisions of the Act to hold  
companies liable for defective purchases.   The new Labour government   promised  in its 1997 
manifesto to “get tough” with loan sharks and predatory lending practices, as well as modernise the 
Act.              
               In 2003 the White Paper on Consumer Credit stated that “consumer credit is central to the 
UK economy”(for consumer credit read “the financial services industry”). The  government wanted to 
encourage an “open and fair credit market, where consumers can make fully informed decisions and 
businesses can compete aggressively on a fair and even basis” [para 1.69]. Fairness would be 
provided through a beefed up licensing regime, and a more consumer friendly unfairness test 
(replacing the extortionate credit bargain test) which could be applied by both courts and ombudsmen. 
One  difference between Crowther and the White Paper of  2003 was the recognition in the latter 
document of   over-indebtedness and financial inclusion as problems of social justice [para 1.70]. 
Education and better access to advice would address overindebtedness but on affordable credit the 
White Paper states merely that “We want low income consumers to have access to affordable credit” 
[para 1.70]. The regulatory impact analysis of the Act indicated that a major objective of the reforms 
was to protect “vulnerable consumers”.              
          The government also developed in the early 2000s  an ambitious combination of measures to 
prevent and treat overindebtedness.106 The objectives included assuring affordable credit, embedding 
responsible lending through a new consumer credit regime, encouraging a savings culture to avoid 
overindebtedness, and the provision of high-quality debt advice. The ‘keys to the achievement of 
these goals’ included the development of financial capability among the population, increases in 
credit unions, the development of alternative forms of affordable credit, and the introduction of a 
stakeholder suite of savings products. In addition to the consumer credit reforms the government  
would tackle illegal moneylenders, improve data sharing to promote responsible lending, provide 
better debt advice, improve insolvency procedures through a Debt Relief Order for low-income 
individuals with no assets, reform Administration Orders and strengthen repayment schemes. These 
priorities were underpinned by the government’s aim to both create an efficient credit market and to 
                                                     
106 See generally DTI/DWP, Tackling Overindebtedness: An Action Plan (London, TSO, 2004) 5–7. 
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‘advance equity in line with the Government’s wider social justice agenda’.107 This is an ambitious 
agenda but the objective of affordable access has not yet been achieved.108    
    One striking consequence of the introduction of the supercomplaint process in the  
Enterprise Act 2002 has been the extent to which the Competition Commission has become involved 
in analysing analysing sub-prime and low income credit markets. The  Commission, operating within 
a  neo-classical economic framework,  has proposed substantial reforms to subprime lending practices 
in order to make these markets more competitive.109 In general its interventions have required greater 
information  provision, opportunities for price comparison and reduction in switching costs.  For 
example, in the home lending market—primarily used by consumers in socio-economic groups D and 
E—the Commission proposed  greater comparative information for borrowers to reduce switching 
costs. The main home lenders must also record information about borrowers with credit bureaux to 
permit good payers to have the opportunity to graduate to a lower cost loan. These reforms may make 
these markets more competitive –individuals will be able to choose between lenders offering loans at 
200% rather than 300%--but  they will still pay a high price for credit. The Commission considered 
carefully whether interest rate ceilings should be introduced but concluded that it might make short 
term loans less available.           
         The UK now  has a dense and overlapping  system of  state and “soft law” regulation  of  
consumer credit including an ex ante system of licensing for all credit providers. It is certainly not 
light touch and fits Braithwaite’s model of “more capitalism, more regulation”.  The existence of 
licensing means that  regulation does not  depend on ex post  individualised actions.    
         The UK initiatives  indicate that  substantial regulation is needed  to ensure that credit markets 
are free and fair. These interventions promise  greater fairness, perhaps slightly lower prices and 
greater choice  for lower income consumers. Fairness within this approach does not  however prevent  
the Poor from  paying  more than middle income consumers for credit. In addition, the ultimate 
objective of promoting confidence in an expanding market for credit assumes that the promotion of 
access rather than protection from credit should be the goals in the UK system. There will remain a 
significant subprime lending market of rent-to-own stores, payday loans, and moneylenders.  The UK 
government assumption is that it is  better for individuals to be within this stratified system of credit, 
with a chance of climbing the ladder of credit, than to be excluded because of controls on  the supply 
side of credit through interest rate ceilings.  A general defence of institutions such as home lending in 
the UK where low income individuals pay high prices for credit is that this form of credit is adjusted 
to the needs of these higher risk consumers who often need to miss payments because of disruptions 
in their lives.110  Mainstream forms of credit such as credit cards could be more dangerous for home 
credit customers given the high default charges for missing payments. 
           Affordable access to credit for low income consumers, particularly for short term loans remains 
an intractable problem. The non-profit sector such as credit unions plays a modest role in providing  
credit for low income consumers in the UK.  Current government policy views the development of the 
credit union sector and Community Development Finance Institutions as central to the provision of 
                                                     
107 Ibid at para 1.12. 
108  See e.g. Financial Inclusion Task Force, Towards a Step Change in 3rd Sector lending coverage and capacity 
(2008) where the  Working Group “conservatively estimates the market for affordable credit as £1.2 billion lent 
to 3,000,000 customers.” 
109  See Competition Commission Reports on Home Lending, Payment Protection Insurance and Store Cards. 
110 The Competition Commission inquiry concluded that the home lending sector served about 2.3 million 
customers annually, lending 2.5 billion in 2004. 
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affordable access.111 Crowther noted in 1970 that  “mutual aid ...” was not part of the British tradition 
in credit compared with the growth of credit unions in other countries. Historically, apart from 
building societies before they were demutualized,  there has been a relative absence of non-market 
institutions providing credit. In the 19th century private pawnbrokers were known as the poor man’s 
bank and  hire-purchase,  moneylenders, and home collected credit provided working class credit.  
Scrutiny of the historical debates of attempts to regulate the price of credit indicates that there was 
always a concern that to do  so would limit credit to the working classes.  Jeremy Bentham’s strictures 
against usury regulation seemed to have been influential.   
 
   Contrasting visions of consumer credit? The Case of France  
                Recent comparative studies argue that  the French legal system is less consumerist112 than 
the US and UK, and  more willing to protect consumers from easy credit which is perceived to 
contribute to potential financial exclusion. 113    The  World Bank Doing Business project  concludes 
that the French civilian tradition is less hospitable to facilitating credit ( a conclusion denied by 
French scholars!)  and  La Porta et al argue that the French civilian tradition is associated with an 
ideology  of greater government ownership and centralised  regulation than the common law. 114   
               There are certainly significant differences  between the UK and France in regulation of the 
consumer credit market. First the existence of interest rate ceilings in  France means that there  is  
much less possibility of  a  legitimate  sub-prime credit industry of payday loans,  and very high cost 
lending.    Second,  credit reporting is operated by a public agency, the Bank of France, and is limited 
to providing creditors with “negative” information on debtors. Third,  there were restrictions on the 
ability of individuals to use homes as a source of equity finance. This was partly altered in 2006 by 
the introduction of the “hypotheque rechargeable”115 ---intended to facilitate home equity credit for 
consumption ---but  there has been little uptake of this form of borrowing.116  Consumer protection 
rules differ somewhat from the UK—the most significant being a  cooling off period of 7 days after 
the “offer prealable”—but  a close scrutiny of these regulations  does not support the argument that,  
absent the usury ceilings, they are significantly more protective than the UK.117 Fourth, there is a 
                                                     
111  See Treasury Financial Inclusion 2008-11 at  2.11 where support for third sector lenders is “ at the heart” of 
government strategy to provide affordable access. 
112  See Whitman op cit supra 
113  See G Trumbull (2006) Consumer Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell) at 25. Whitman, 2008... 
114  R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes and A Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2007) Civil 
law ideology is “much more comfortable with the centralized and activist government”. 
115  Ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 relative aux sûretés  modifying Art. 2422. - 
L'hypothèque peut être ultérieurement affectée à la garantie de créances autres que celles mentionnées 
par l'acte constitutif pourvu que celui-ci le prévoie expressément. 
« Le constituant peut alors l'offrir en garantie, dans la limite de la somme prévue dans l'acte constitutif et 
mentionnée à l'article 2423, non seulement au créancier originaire, mais aussi à un nouveau créancier encore que 
le premier n'ait pas été payé. 
« La convention de rechargement qu'il passe, soit avec le créancier originaire, soit avec le nouveau créancier, 
revêt la forme notariée 
116  French housing finance is unique in its use of guarantees rather than mortgages by financial institutions. The 
process 
117 The 2007 Economic and Social Council report on over-indebtedness claims that consumer protection in 
France for debtors is more protective than the Anglo-Saxon approach.    The report identifies usury regulations, 
the 7 day cooling off period, the possibility of obtaining a delay in payment, the protection attached to a credit 
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larger cooperative banking sector in France.  Finally,  over-indebted consumers have a range of  
public and private alternatives in England and  Wales for which they must generally pay a fee, 
whereas in France there appears to be a single gateway for the over-indebted consumer. This is the 
process  managed by the Bank of France which runs the network of over-indebtedness commissions in 
each department and which provide a free service to consumers. 
             In  2004 outstanding consumer credit per capita was 2,200 euro in France and 4,400 euro in 
the UK.  Younger individuals and those on modest incomes have less access to consumer credit in 
France than the UK.118 There are substantially lower numbers of credit cards in France. However 
there is an initial  apparent paradox because about 180,000 individuals in France annually make 
applications to the over-indebtedness commissions established by the Bank of France whereas in 
England and Wales a substantially smaller number of individuals  apply for bankruptcy or an 
Individual Voluntary Arrangement.119 This apparent paradox is explicable by the absence of the many 
private debt management programmes which exist in England  with estimates of 150,000 debt 
management plans being commenced annually.   
                    Concerns were  raised  that  French consumers are “under-indebted” and that this has had 
a detrimental effect on the growth of the French economy.   In 2006 a French  Senate Report raised 
the question whether consumer credit made too limited a contribution  to economic growth120.   The 
Bourdin report argued that public policy since the 1980s had been focused on over-indebtedness and 
protection from debt.  This resulted in  an over-cautious approach  to credit granting  with the 
consequence  that some individuals did not get access to credit.  The Canivet report on the hypotheque 
generale saw it as a method of promoting credit to groups which might not traditionally obtain credit.  
Bourdin argued that the costs of limiting credit included the loss of growth which is linked to 
economic growth and employment, the costs to the individual of being refused credit and the 
distributive injustice of those with deposits in banks who finance low cost credit for better off 
individuals121.   Bourdin proposed  a more liberal regime for accessing home equity, and opening a 
debate on  positive credit reporting and existing  usury restrictions.   
               Subsequently the French government did  make it easier for individuals to use their homes as 
security for ordinary credit purchases and greater use of consumer credit is advocated  but without the 
problems of “Anglo-Saxon” over-indebtedness.  However the credit crunch seems to have resulted in 
a backlash against consumer credit, particularly revolving credit..  The implementation of the 2008  
European Consumer Credit Directive has provided the French government with the opportunity of 
making some modest further reforms of consumer credit law including a mandatory information 
obligation on consumer credit products that  “Un crédit vous engage et doit être remboursé".122   The  
introduction of positive credit reporting has once again been raised123.      
                                                                                                                                                                     
sale, the transparency and information obligations on the cost of credit, and regulation of revolving credit in 
2005 providing greater disclosure and the requirement of an “offer prealable” if the creditor wishes to increase 
the consumer’s credit limit.  The Council recommended that borrowers should be provided with a “Coeur du 
contract” disclosure. 
118 See Les Enjeux Economiques et Sociaux de l’Industrie Bancaire, Comite Consultatif du secteur financier 
Pastre Report (2006) at 79. 
119 The French data are from the Banque de France 
120  See Rapport d’information sur l’accèss des ménages au crédit en France par M. Joël Bourdin No 261 (2006) 
121 Id. at 51. 
122 Projet de loi portant reforme du credit a la consummation (2                  009). 
123  See Senate Report , Rapporteur Philippe Dominati (2 June 2009). 
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              The  differences between the UK and  France are emblematic of differences within the EU in 
approaches to consumer credit and tensions between neo-liberalism and a social market approach. On 
one hand a  primary goal of EU policy in recent years has been to foster a competitive  and integrated 
European credit and financial services market. This is part of the Lisbon agenda.   Examples  include 
the payments directive,124 the Green paper on retail financial services125 and several actions brought 
by DG Competition concerning credit card services and state subsidies of financial services providers 
that might inhibit access by competing firms.126 The recent EU Consumer Credit Directive127 is 
primarily concerned with achieving a more competitive credit market and  adopts a targeted full 
harmonisation approach to those issues that are intended to facilitate cross border competition in 
credit: standardised pre-contractual information and calculation of the APR, a 14 day right of 
withdrawal, and rules on early repayment. It does not view the current directive as part of “the fight 
against overindebtedness”.128 However the  Commission (through different DGs) has   initiated 
projects to develop a common definition of over-indebtedness and to study financial exclusion 129 and 
a recent report  proposes that financial services should be viewed as services of general interest and 
that as part of the European model of society all individuals should have affordable access.   
 
                                                     
 124 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on 
payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC Text with EEA relevance. 
 
 125 Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the Single Market Brussels, 30.4.2007 COM(2007) 226 
final. 
 
 126 See in relation to Carte Bancaire Decision of the Commission 17 X 2007 under article 81 of the 
Treaty COMP/D1/38606 GROUPEMENT DES CARTES BANCAIRES Bruxelles, le 17 X 2007 C(2007) 5060 
final; Press release Antitrust: Commission initiates formal proceedings against Visa Europe Limited ( 26/03/08): 
Press Release Antitrust: Commission fines Visa €10.2 million for refusing to admit Morgan Stanley as a 
member 03/10/2007. 
 
 127 Directive 2008/48/EC on Credit Agreements for Consumers (2008) O.J. L133/66. 
 
 128 Evidence of Dirk Staudenmeyer on behalf of the European Commission to the House of Lords 
European Union Committee reported in 36th Report of Session 2005-06 Consumer Credit in the European 
Union: Harmonisation and Consumer Protection Vol. 1 Report HL Paper 201-I at 59. 
 
 129 See EU Commission, Towards a Common Operational European Definition of Overindebtedness 
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008); Financial services provision and the 
prevention of financial exclusion Overview Paper March 2007. 
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